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John Allen Tucker’s new book provides fresh English translations of the
philosophical works Bendô (‘Distinguishing the way’; completed 1717) and
Benmei (‘Distinguishing names’; probably completed around the same time
or a little later) by the great Japanese Confucian scholar Ogyû Sorai (1666–
1728). The book is a considerable achievement. Tucker is an experienced
translator of Tokugawa Confucian texts, and this is his best translation.
The first third or so of the book consists of generous introductory material.
Chapter 1 provides a conspectus of Sorai’s thought which outlines Tucker’s
basic reading of his texts. From the start, he is eager to dissociate his views
on Sorai from those of Maruyama Masao, surely the greatest modern interpreter
of Sorai. Indeed an anti-Maruyama motif informs much of this introduction.
Tucker dissents from the view that he imputes to Maruyama that Sorai was
‘the pivotal figure in the development of a modern political consciousness’.
Overall this study suggests that Sorai’s thought was not a modernizing force,
but rather one appealing anachronistically to the fundamentals of an archaic
political tradition for the sake of fashioning an ideology of shogunal absolutism.
(p. 11)
This kind of writing, however, seems too blunt to do justice to the dazzling
reach, depth and sophistication of Maruyama’s thought. Maruyama himself
was acutely aware of the reactionary nature of Sorai’s political ideas; his
analysis operated at a different level. He wrote: ‘It is one of the ironies of
history that a reactionary may be forced to use the theoretical weapons of his
opponents. While Sorai abhorred Gesellschaft social relationships, the
Gesellschaft logic was embedded in his theory of invention’ (Studies in the
Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, tr. Mikiso Hane, University of Tokyo
Press, 1974, p. 222 [hereafter, Studies]).
Tucker robustly characterizes Sorai as authoritarian and utilitarian, an
articulator of the ideological needs of the Tokugawa bakufu. He also insistently
stresses the importance of ‘philosophical dictionaries’, the genre in which he
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places the ‘two Ben’. Benmei in particular is a response to the Xingli ziyi of
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the Song scholar Chen Beixi. ‘Genre’, Tucker claims, is the key to ‘the
utilitarian and authoritarian themes’ of Bendô and Benmei. It can, indeed,
lead to interesting insights. Thus we learn that Beixi
explained that terms in his lexicon were arranged according to their immediacy
to people’s daily concerns. Sorai, on the other hand, opened his lexicon with
an exposition of the notion most relevant to rulers at least as he defined it –
the way. (p. 21)
No one would disagree that ‘philosophical dictionaries’ are an important and
interesting vehicle for Confucian thought. But there were also even more
prestigious and authoritative, if less concise, genres, such as commentaries,
that were also ways of communicating revisionist views. In fact, the genre
that Sorai invested most scholarly effort in was canonical commentary. He
himself regarded his Analects commentary, Rongo chô, as his life’s work and
probably the serious basis for any claim to importance as a Confucian scholar.
It was this work that became known in eighteenth-century China. Most of the
polemical views expressed in the two Ben are expressed there, where they
are based on readings of specific canonical texts. Tucker’s insistence on the
importance of genre also produces some ponderous claims:
Contextualized within the genre that he wrote, Sorai appears not so much as a
thinker who in every respect broke with a particular intellectual tradition as
one aggressively and systematically engaged in what came to be seen as a
radically heterodox revision and reformulation of it. (p. 15)
Thereafter, the introduction proceeds to a description of Benmei, entry by
entry. No doubt, space in what is a long book precluded a deeper exploration
of Sorai’s thought here. As it stands, this section is somewhat superficial.
In Chapters 2 and 3, Tucker provides what in Japanese might be referred to
as a juyôshi or reception history of Sorai’s thought. This account is something
of a pioneering foray, and it, too, offers rewards. It is, however, necessarily
selective, since Sorai’s radical views have always stimulated a great volume
of comment and continue to do so. Chapter 2 deals with the Tokugawa
period. Maintaining his critical stance towards Maruyama, Tucker rejects his
contention that the decades following Sorai’s death were a ‘golden age’ for
his ideas. He points to Sorai’s lack of biological heirs who might perpetuate
his influence. Rather than ‘a succession of champions’, there was a ‘succession
of acerbic critiques’. ‘Statistics’, he claims, ‘have misrepresented Sorai’s
legacy, suggesting that his school was the largest heterodox contingent among
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domain schools’ (p. 48). But it is hard to dismiss the evidence of such
McMullen: Tucker, Ogyû Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks 215
scholars as Ishikawa Ken or of Kasai Sukeharu for the diffusion of Sorai
learning for the period up till the Kansei reforms. Whether, to what extent,
and at what level, Sorai’s polemic resulted in what Maruyama called the
‘disintegration’ of Song Neo-Confucian thinking is a matter of controversy.
It does seem likely that Sorai’s influence was acidic, eating at the credibility
of the Song Neo-Confucian conception of the world and man’s role in it till a
formal and bookish structure was left. But Tucker takes the side of those who
downplay Sorai’s importance. The relative failure of Sorai’s Kobunjigaku
[School of ancient philology; the name given to Sorai’s style of Confucianism],
he argues, was due partly to the ‘linguistic difficulty and profound cultural
dissonance involved in learning to read and write unpunctuated Chinese as
Chinese’ (p. 46). Moreover, ‘Sorai’s followers [were] mostly literary specialists
known for their supposed frivolity and dissipation’ (p. 48). Hostility to Sorai,
meanwhile, was rife, chiefly articulated by commoner Confucians and those
of nativist persuasion. In the latter context, Tucker glances at Ishida Baigan,
the Kaitokudô thinkers, and nativist scholars such as Kamo Mabuchi and
Motoori Norinaga.
On Sorai’s side, Tucker concentrates on Dazai Shundai and Yamagata
Daini, as Sorai’s main intellectual heirs. Daini was executed by the bakufu
for treason in 1767. Tucker writes that his ‘development of Sorai’s political
thought [suggested that] the study of ancient texts could ultimately lead to
the resurrection of frightening themes from ancient Chinese philosophy that
Sorai had politely avoided [...]’ (p. 56).
Such suspicions culminated in the Kansei prohibition of heterodoxy and its
associated purge of Sorai’s influence from official schools. Tucker writes
that it was ‘motivated by bakufu awareness that reformulations of Sorai’s
Kobunjigaku ideas were taking their advocates in directions never explicitly
acknowledged by Sorai’ (pp. 74–75). He accepts, however, Herman Ooms’s
point that Matsudaira Sadanobu, the leading figure in the Kansei Reform
movement, believed, with Sorai, that the political system was man made,
rather than natural. Why then did Sadanobu ban Sorai’s ideas? Tucker suggests
that ‘sense can be made of this’; on the one hand, Sadanobu ‘recognized the
value of Sorai’s political philosophy to rulers insofar as it empowered them
to manipulate the polity in ways that would promote peace and security’; but,
on the other, Sorai’s ideas were ‘potentially dangerous’ if widely diffused,
again because they could sanction change in the status quo (p. 77). Under
these circumstances, it was only prudent to ban them.
There is probably truth in this argument, and it is possible to go further. It
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the anti-Sorai purge. There were positive reasons for choosing Zhu Xi
Confucianism as an educational orthodoxy at this time. Sadanobu’s early
Confucian studies had been with a scholar of the Sorai persuasion. Sadanobu,
in fact, was influenced by Sorai more, simply, than in his historicist view of
the man-made status of the Confucian way. Thus he advocated imposition of
unity of thought and suppression of subjectivity, subscribed to Sorai’s
functionalist view of the different social roles in society, and seems to have
accepted Sorai’s utilitarian and instrumental approach to ideas and practices.
Sadanobu selected ‘orthodox’ Zhu Xi Confucianism as the bakufu’s exclusive
educational orthodoxy for positive, but instrumental reasons. He himself was
a man of intense, authoritarian and ascetic temperament; when he came to
power and influence within the bakufu, he was horrified at the laxness of
bakufu retainers. He felt that rigorous study and practice of Zhu Xi Neo-
Confucianism, imposed as an orthodoxy with no room for dissent, was the
best method to recover discipline in the samurai community. In Sorai’s terms,
Neo-Confucianism, though discredited by Sorai’s own polemics, could remain
a legitimate ‘technique’ towards this end. Thus, despite its superficially Neo-
Confucian character, the Kansei Reform, arguably, at a deeper level reflects
the penetration of Sorai’s utilitarian thinking. As Maruyama himself put it,
the Kansei reform was ‘an attempt to impose feudal standards as a natural
law by force when they had already lost such self-evident validity’ (Studies,
p. 282). Not surprisingly, this was an uncomfortable position. It generated
anomalies such as, for instance, Sadanobu’s own rejection of the ritual
veneration of Confucius in his Shirakawa domain school. But such
contradictions are more easily explained when Sorai is recognized as a
fundamental influence on Sadanobu.
Chapter 3 surveys Sorai in modern intellectual history. Again, this is an
instructive and, it has to be said, sometimes provocative, exploration. Major
themes are the ‘noteworthy subcurrent’ of Sorai’s ideas in the Meiji restoration,
the impact of Sorai’s apparent Sinophilia, criticism of Maruyama Masao, and
the enduring importance of the genre of ‘philosophical lexicography’. Major
Restoration figures such as Katô Hiroyuki and Fukuzawa Yukichi were familiar
with and influenced by Sorai’s ideas. Nishi Amane’s knowledge of Sorai’s
work ‘served as a source of inspiration regarding the possibility of wholesale
definition’ of the concepts of modern political life (p. 92). But with Yamaji
Aizan, who drew attention to the similarity between Sorai’s thought and that
of Jeremy Bentham, the beginnings of nationalist reaction against Sorai’s
Sinophilia set in. Tucker is informative on Inoue Tetsujirô, the pioneer historian
Japonica Humboldtiana 10 (2006)
of Tokugawa Confucianism, and his seminal triadic division of Tokugawa
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Confucianism into the Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming and Ancient Learning schools.
But Inoue, too, criticized Sorai for ‘exclusive and single-minded worship of
China’ (p. 105). This chauvinist trend intensifies until, exceptionally among
major Tokugawa Confucians, Sorai was denied posthumous rank. In the
ultranationalist period, he was accorded ‘pariah’ status (p. 110).
During and after the war itself, Tucker concedes that Maruyama was a
‘crucial bridge’ between pre- and post-war understandings of Sorai. He
‘follow[ed] a modified Hegelian mode of explanation derived in part from
Inoue’ (p. 112); but his interpretation, Tucker argues, is too teleologically
preoccupied with ‘modernity’ to retain permanent value. He refers to
Maruyama’s ‘profoundly provocative misinterpretations’ (p. 113), ‘hyperbolic
claims’ and ‘rudimentary’ abilities in Chinese (p. 116). By contrast, Yoshikawa
Kôjirô’s quieter and sinologically better-informed approach is praised, but he
is faulted for failing to recognize the importance of philosophical lexicography.
Bitô Masahide receives informative treatment, particularly for his insights
into how Sorai’s views on the place of religion in administration were
interpreted in the ultranationalist period.
On Western interpreters of Sorai, Tucker writes that J.R. McEwan’s early
but quite modest book (1962) is ‘all the more reliable’ (p. 115) for his
apparent unawareness of Maruyama’s work. H.D. Harootunian’s Towards
Restoration, by contrast, ‘echo[es Maruyama’s teleological concerns], with a
new touch of hyperbole’, and is by now ‘badly dated’ (p. 116). Herman
Ooms’s work, he finds, is more satisfactory in this respect. The Western
scholars whom Tucker seems most to admire are Olof G. Lidin for his
‘monumental contribution’ (p. 115) to Sorai studies in the west, made chiefly
through his translation of Seidan, a work that complements Tucker’s own;
William Theodore de Bary, in his many publications, for his nuanced and
more cautious assessment of Sorai’s intellectual relationship to Neo-
Confucianism. Even de Bary, however, joins the company of those found
wanting for underestimating the importance of philosophical lexicography.
Samuel Yamashita is mentioned favourably for his translation of Tômonsho.
Tucker also touches on the work of Carmen Blacker, Richard H. Minear and
Kate W. Nakai. Of the most recent publications on Sorai, he finds Tetsuo
Najita ‘overly sympathetic’ in his account of Sorai’s ‘social thinking’ (p.
129); Naoki Sakai’s post-modernist interpretation is ‘sadly unconvincing’;
besides, he, too, is insensitive to the ‘lexicographic organization’ of Sorai’s
work (p. 130). The Swiss scholar Olivier Ansart is censured for his neglect
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‘extensive discussion of Sorai’s thought in relation to Western philosophy’
(p. 134).
The remaining two thirds of the book are given over to translated text and
annotations. It is here that Tucker’s work is likely to have the greatest impact.
It will serve as a valuable introduction to Sorai’s thought for those who do
not read Chinese or Japanese. For specialists, it will make a useful starting
point. In general, Tucker’s English version is accurate and readable. There
are inevitably some slips, mostly of minor importance. ‘King Liang of Qi’
should be ‘the kings of Liang and Qi’ (Bendô, in Nihon shisô taikei, vol. 36
[hereafter, NST], p. 201/15; Tucker, p. 143); Tucker seems to understand
zhong , which refers to ‘the multitude’ of members of a category as ‘the
people’ (NST, p. 223/82; Tucker, p. 218); he seems to misunderstand the
word zhi  as ‘refinement’, where it clearly means ‘substantial qualities’
(NST, 205/27; Tucker, p. 156); where he translates Sorai as saying of the
‘school of principle’ that ‘their words are sincere’, the correct rendering
should surely be ‘that is truly so’ (NST, p. 205/28; Tucker, p. 157); where he
translates Sorai as writing ‘people in the north see entirely what is in the
south’, he should understand ‘when you look from the north, what you see
becomes south’ (NST, p. 205/28; Tucker, p. 157).
Elsewhere, it is sometimes possible to challenge Tucker’s choice of English
equivalent for some of Sorai’s vocabulary. Thus he translates wang  as ‘far
fetched’ (e.g. NST, p. 210/43; Tucker, p. 174) , a word defined in the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary as ‘strained’. Sorai’s sense is surely stronger,
more like ‘nonsense’ or ‘nonsensical’. Tucker’s translation of the moral term
shu as ‘empathy’ may be right for the sense given this word by Itô Jinsai,
whose Go-Mô jigi Tucker translated in 1998. However, Sorai himself seems
to refute it in Benmei. His radical elitism led him explicitly to cast doubt on
the possibility of the ‘small man’ understanding the ‘princely man’ (NST, p.
225/91; Tucker, p. 228). For Sorai, shu, in fact is not an affective term; rather
it refers to reciprocating actions. Thus Sorai quoted Confucius’ own negative
and restrictive definition: ‘What you do not want done to yourself, do not do
to others’ (Analects, XV, 23). The translation of shu as ‘reciprocity’ by
James Legge seems closer to Sorai’s understanding.
Another, more serious, doubt concerns Tucker’s use of ‘ritual principles’
to translate the important term yi, conventionally rendered in many Confucian
contexts as ‘righteousness’. Yi is indeed a multivalent and problematic word.
Morohashi’s Dai Kan-Wa jiten lists 24 meanings, excluding proper nouns.
One sense particularly relevant to the present discussion is ‘meaning’. The
Japonica Humboldtiana 10 (2006)
rendering ‘righteousness’ reflects the moral understanding of the word in the
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Mencian and Neo-Confucian tradition within Confucianism. But Sorai was
hostile to this interpretation and wished to recover what he identified as the
pristine sense of the word.
Tucker’s translation of yi as ‘ritual principles’ is not entirely consistent
(e.g. NST, pp. 239/133–34; Tucker, pp. 276–77, translating the word as used
by Itô Jinsai and others), a fact that might suggest uneasiness about its settled
meaning. An initial response to ‘ritual principles’ is that this locution sits
uneasily with Sorai’s well-known insistence that the original Confucian way,
the Way created by the Former Kings, is concrete and external rather than
abstract. Tucker’s translation also results in an awkward pairing with his
choice of ‘rational principle’ to translate li, another concept whose conven-
tional, Neo-Confucian interpretation Sorai sought to modify. For Sorai, yi
were normative, where li had ‘no fixed standard’, and were thus descriptive
only (NST, p. 244/150; Tucker, p. 296).
There are, however, more serious reasons to question the use of ‘ritual
principles’. It is clear, first, that the multiple meanings of yi posed a problem
for Sorai himself. In works of his maturity, he makes a number of what
seem, prima facie, to be startling contradictions or inconsistencies over this
word. Thus in Benmei (NST, p. 223/82; Tucker, p. 218, adapted), he asserts
that: ‘The three hundred major rituals and the three thousand rules of demeanour
all possess yi existing in them.’ Yet in his Analects commentary (Rongo chô,
commenting on Analects IX, 3 (i) Tôyô bunko edtn. [hereafter Rongo chô],
vol. 2, p. 13), he writes: ‘In general, rituals are what the ancient Sages fixed,
yet there are those which possess yi and those which do not possess yi’. Or
again, in Ken’en jippitsu (Ogyû Sorai zenshû, Kawade Shobô edtn. [hereafter
OSZ], vol. 3, p. 568/389), he claims that: ‘The quality of the Book of Historical
Documents as a repository of yi is simply patently clear’. But at the same
time, he could also claim: ‘Before Confucius, rights and music existed, yet
men did not know their yi’ (Ibid., p. 513/256).
Tucker has clearly given the translation of this difficult word serious thought;
what follows is in the spirit of exploring alternative possibilities. In the
sketch below, it is argued that Sorai developed a subtle narrative of the
history of yi, in part to accommodate the diverse and shifting meanings of the
word in canonical Confucian texts, in part for his own polemical purposes. It
is his understanding of yi in these different senses that explains Sorai’s
apparent inconsistencies quoted above. He traced three successive stages in
the development of the term: (i) as an objective institution of conduct: this
was the yi of the former Kings, or the ‘ancient yi’; (ii) as ‘meaning’ or
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Tucker’s ‘ritual principles’ conveys the sense of (ii), but is arguably less
suitable for (i) and (ii).
(i) The institutional yi of the Former Kings
Sorai insisted that, in the first sense, yi, like ‘rituals’ , were originally ‘set up’
(li ) by the ‘Former Kings’. They were a ‘division’ or ‘subset’ (fen ) of
the Way (NST, p. 220/75; Tucker, p. 211). In his Analects commentary, he
refers to yi in this sense as ‘ancient yi’ (guyi 	; Rongo chô, vol. I, p. 167).
In Keishishi yôran, Sorai cross-referenced his explanation of yi to Benmei,
but also supplied a definition in the Japanese language:
The Way of the Former Kings fixes and lays down what men must necessarily
do and what they should not do. This is called yi (OSZ, vol. I, p. 344).
The yi, he insisted, were ‘of the same category as ritual’ (li 
; Rongo chô,
loc.cit.). ‘Yi are the detailed aspect of rituals and refer to [the thousand
discriminations and ten thousand disparities within society] respectively
determining their appropriate place’ ( NST, p. 222/81; Tucker, p. 217, adapted).
This language suggests that yi were like ‘rituals’, objective institutions. Indeed,
yi were the material source of rituals.
One would say that yi are a division of the Way. The thousand discriminations
and ten thousand disparities each have their proper place [...]. The former
Kings [...] took those thousand discriminations and ten thousand disparities
and systematized them to make them rituals (NST, p. 220/75; Tucker, p. 21,
adapted).
By gathering the many yi, the rituals are established and benevolence is
completed (NST, p. 223/82; Tucker, p. 218, adapted).
Despite this commonality, Sorai insisted explicitly that ‘ritual and yi are
different’; yi could, it seemed, also ‘refer to what was not in the ritual system
of the Former Kings’ (Ken’en jippitsu, OSZ, vol. I, p. 521/274). Furthermore,
ritual had a fixed organization and structure, while yi are addressed to the
wider flow of events. This distinction is made clear in the first definition of
yi in Benmei:
[R]ituals have a fixed form. However, the affairs of the realm are inexhaustible.
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McMullen: Tucker, Ogyû Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks 221
‘Ritual and yi are the great beginnings (duan ) of men’ (‘Li Yun’ Book
from Book of Rites; NST, p. 220/75; Tucker, p. 210, adapted).
Further, their purpose was different;
‘Ritual regulates the mind; yi regulates affairs.’ (quoting ‘Zhong Hui’, Book
of Historical Documents). Ritual preserves invariance; yi responds to changes
[sc. departures from the norm] (NST, p. 220/75; Tucker, p. 210, adapted).
In Benmei, Sorai illustrated how yi featured in governance:
The lord co-ordinates the whole [of the Way], but the ministers are
commissioned [to regulate] its parts. They have their respective duties of
office and what they take as their affairs. These are the thousand discriminations
and ten thousand disparities. Thus if they do not follow yi, they do not
perform well. (NST, p. 222/79; Tucker, p. 215, adapted).
Yi, therefore, is a flexible system of procedures and responses for regulating
the innumerable changing circumstances of daily life with its hierarchies and
differentials, while ‘ritual’ is an invariant structure specially addressed to
regulating men’s state of mind. Clearly, there is a close relationship: yi are
almost a necessary condition for ritual, and are a constituent element of most,
but not apparently all, rituals. Tucker’s translation of ‘ritual principles’,
however, restricts the meaning of yi by essentially subsuming it into ritual; it
seems to elide the broader application of yi to quotidian society.
If it is questionable to interpret Sorai’s pristine yi mainly in the context of
ritual as Tucker’s translation suggests, what of the translation ‘principle’?
The English word ‘principle’ has the sense of ‘a primary [...] law which
produces or determines particular results’, or ‘general law or rule as a guide
to action’ (S.O.E.D.). In his commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean, Sorai
wrote: ‘Yi are that by which response is made to change [sc. variations from
the norm]; thus they should not be spoken of as being held fast to’ (zhi ;
OSZ, vol. 2, p. 658). It was also ‘by depending on the ancient yi of the
Former Kings that the people of old determined the rightness of things’
(Rongo chô, loc. cit.). Such passages might tend to support the interpretation
that yi are indeed, as Tucker’s use of ‘principle’ suggests, somehow and
subtly abstract. In that sense, yi might be thought of as a body of discrete
principles, perhaps appropriately described as a grammar, to be applied in
particular circumstances. But Sorai says explicitly of the Six Classics, the
record of the Way of the Former Kings, that they describe ‘things’ (wu ),
that is concrete entities (NST, p. 200/12; Tucker, p. 139). Included here were
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Sorai repeatedly cited as the ‘“repositories of yi”’ (quoting Zuo zhuan, Duke
Xi 27). One might therefore suggest a cautious definition of Sorai’s pristine
yi such as ‘a detailed grammar of behaviour that is applied flexibly to the
changing circumstances of a hierarchical social and political world; the
constituent elements of rituals’.
Such a definition, however, does not support the translation of yi as ‘ritual
principles’. A quite close analogy, from the parallel military world, may be
helpful. Soldiers practise a system of responses and procedures in the changing
circumstances of daily military work; these responses must be flexible enough
to enable them to perform their role (cf. yi). Some of this grammar, such as
the forms for handling weapons and bodily movements in drill, is formalized
as the elements of ceremonial parades (cf. rituals). These parades, like rituals
generally, have a permanent structure; they may indeed, like rituals, serve
religious or political purposes. But like Sorai’s rituals, they are addressed
less to the ongoing course of affairs than to men’s affective understanding of
their worlds, to their ‘minds’. Thus one would not naturally call the soldier’s
grammar of daily work ‘parade principles’. In the light of this analogy, it can
be seen that ‘ritual principles’ either restricts yi too narrowly to its constituent
role in ‘ritual’ or, conversely, concedes too broad a role to ritual. Indeed, in
an interesting passage, Sorai took Itô Jinsai to task precisely for taking ‘ritual’
to be concerned with dealing with ‘affairs’ (Ken’en jippitsu, OSZ, vol. I, p.
533/303).
(ii) Yi as the meaning or principles behind the rituals
The second sense of yi for Sorai was the product of Confucius’ particular and
disadvantaged historical circumstances and historical role. Confucius lived in
a period of political and moral decline. The Way of the Former Kings was no
longer observed in full, and Confucius, denied the opportunity to create
rituals himself, took on the task of exegesis of the Way. He thus addressed
the ‘meaning’ of the institutional components of the pristine Way. For Sorai,
the Confucian texts most directly associated with Confucius, the Analects
and the Book of Rites, conveyed these ‘meanings’ (NST, p. 200/12; Tucker,
p. 139). Indeed Confucius’ role was seminal.
Before Confucius, rights and music existed, yet men did not know their yi
(Ken’en jippitsu, OSZ, vol. 3, p. 513/256; elsewhere, Confucius had merely
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The meanings that Confucius thus explicated were latent in all rituals. ‘The
major rituals and the three thousand rules of demeanour all have yi existing
in them’ (NST, p. 223/82; Tucker, p. 218, adapted). However, Confucius’
discourse on the meanings of ritual, though important in securing their
perpetuation to posterity, was a secondary development, as is indicated by a
careful reading of Sorai’s wording in Benmei.
The former Kings had already systematized these thousand distinctions and
ten thousand disparities and made them into rituals. Scholars [sc. among
them, Confucius and the authors of the Book of Rites] further transmitted the
intentions (yi) whereby they had systematized them. These are the so-called
‘meanings’ (sc. essences, principles) of the rituals’ (NST, p. 220/75; Tucker,
p. 211, adapted; italics added).
This sense of yi as ‘meaning’ is clearly intended to cover such uses of yi as
occur in the titles of the books of the Book of Rites, such as the ‘Meaning of
Sacrifice’. It is this meaning of yi that comes closest to and perhaps justifies
Tucker’s ‘ritual principles’. In this sense, however, Sorai insists yi were still
‘necessarily attached to things’, that is the concreteness of ritual (NST, p.
200/12; Tucker, p.139, adapted). To pursue the military analogy above, it is
possible to explicate the ‘meaning’ of a ceremonial parade with close reference
to its component elements, much as one might that of a ritual.
For Sorai, yi in this exegetical sense remained legitimate. Nonetheless, this
usage, according to Sorai, opened the path to the third and deleterious use of
yi. As a potentially ‘empty word’ (NST, p. 220/75; Tucker, p. 211, adapted),
it carried a danger. Sorai even seems to suggest that yi in this sense was
actually otiose; in the ideal world, there was no need for exegesis:
Rituals are things. Many yi [sc. meanings, principles] are packed full in them.
However eloquent one may be supposed to be, one cannot express their full
meaning. Therefore, their benefit lies in silently knowing them (NST, p.
219/71; Tucker, p. 206, adapted).
3. Yi as a subjective virtue
As further historical decline took place, Confucius’ disciples, ‘wanting people
to understand the rituals, lectured them urgently and incessantly on their
meaning [...]. During the Warring States period, their meanings were divorced
from the rituals and came to be discussed in isolation.’ (NST, p. 219/71;
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Tucker, p. 206, adapted). A further deterioration took place with Mencius.
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For polemical purposes, he had incautiously spoken in a way that might
suggest that ‘the principle of ritual’ was an aspect of human nature, an inborn
propensity of conduct. Thereafter, it came to be interpreted as a subjective
virtue, to the detriment of the true Confucian teaching. To extend the military
analogy once more, the spirit informing ceremonial parades came to be regarded
as a broader virtue and even as a natural human propensity, independent of
its original institutional basis.
More research is needed. But if this sketch does correctly reflect Sorai’s
understanding of yi, Tucker’s ‘ritual principles’ are appropriate for (ii) above.
There, Sorai does indeed understand yi as the ‘meaning [or principles] of
ritual’. What seems to have happened, however, is that Tucker has read back
this ritual-centered interpretation onto (i). He compounds this by misinter-
preting the ‘thousand distinctions and ten thousand disparities’ to apply to
‘ritual’ rather than to society at large. He can be seen doing this in the
following passage:
Now, ritual  principles are best understood as part of the way. The myriad
differences and myriad distinctions within the rites, each has its right place.
[...] Since the early kings systematized the rites recognizing the myriad
distinctions intrinsic to them, scholars still transmit the ideas involved in
systematizing of the rites (NST, p. 220/75; Tucker, p. 211).
The added italics suggest where Tucker has inflated Sorai’s text and imposed
his own preconception of the relationship between ‘ritual’ and yi. The passage
would be more accurately translated:
One would say that yi are a division of the Way. The former Kings had
already systematized these thousand distinctions and ten thousand disparities
and made them into rituals. Scholars [sc. Confucius and the authors of the
Book of Rites] further transmitted the intentions whereby they had systematized
them. These are what is called the ‘meanings’ [sc. essences, principles] of the
rituals.
As a result, Tucker’s reading of Sorai’s thought elides the broader role of yi;
Tucker’s Sorai subsumes social regulation largely under ritual; the historical
Sorai was more subtle and more balanced.
How then, should Sorai’s yi be translated? No single English word seems
available easily to cover the three senses explored above. However, in senses
(i) and (ii), the English ‘proprieties’ seems appropriate, for the propriety or
the proprieties are both objective norms and ‘propriety’ can be an abstract
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virtue. According to the S.O.E.D., there is even a special, albeit rarer, sense
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of ‘propriety’ as the ‘essence’ of something. This comes quite close to sense
(ii) above.
The book is well produced. Tucker has furnished copious and helpful notes
on his text. Chinese and Japanese words are supplied in romanized form,
albeit not entirely consistently. It is a shame, however, that the University of
Hawai‘i Press has apparently banished Chinese characters. A character list is
of particular value in works that, like Tucker’s, treat sources in both Chinese
and Japanese.
As analysis of just one word above suggests, Sorai is not an easy thinker.
His own radically revisionist treatment of a highly sophisticated scholastic
tradition led him to difficult formulations. Behind the facade of authoritarian
elitism, there are often subtle manipulations of ancient Confucian concepts.
There are also ambiguities. Sorai’s thought is too complex to yield quickly to
definitive understanding. Interpreting his work in English or any other foreign
language poses especially daunting problems. With his new and conscientious
translation of Bendô and Benmei, Tucker has made a significant contribution
to the study of this important and original thinker outside Japan. This book is
to be welcomed.
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